

MA2017-6

**MARINE ACCIDENT  
INVESTIGATION REPORT**

**June 29, 2017**



The objective of the investigation conducted by the Japan Transport Safety Board in accordance with the Act for Establishment of the Japan Transport Safety Board is to determine the causes of an accident and damage incidental to such an accident, thereby preventing future accidents and reducing damage. It is not the purpose of the investigation to apportion blame or liability.

Kazuhiro Nakahashi  
Chairman  
Japan Transport Safety Board

Note:

This report is a translation of the Japanese original investigation report. The text in Japanese shall prevail in the interpretation of the report.

# MARINE ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

May 25, 2017

Adopted by the Japan Transport Safety Board

Member Kuniaki Shoji

Member Satoshi Kosuda


Member Mina Nemoto

<b>Accident Type</b>	Collision
<b>Date and time</b>	November 2, 2015, around 21:09 (local time, UTC+9 hours)
<b>Location</b>	In the west-northwest off Cape Kodomari, Nakadomari Town, Aomori Prefecture, Japan Around 281 degrees true bearing, 13.1 nautical miles from Kodomari Misaki North Lighthouse (approximately 41° 10.8' N 139° 58.4' E)
<b>Summary of the accident</b>	Cargo ship, BALTIA, moving southwest and fishing vessel, RYOHOMARU No.8, moving east-southeast collided. The master of RYOHOMARU No.8 was injured, and the vessel had damage, etc. at the head. BALTIA had abrasion damage at the starboard stem side.
<b>Course of the accident investigation</b>	The Japan Transport Safety Board appointed an investigator-in-charge from Hakodate Office and another investigator to investigate this accident on November 5, 2015. Comments on the draft report were invited from parties relevant to the cause of accident. Comments on the draft report were invited from the flag State of BALTIA.
<b>Factual information</b> Vessel type and name, Gross tonnage, Vessel number, Owner, LxBxD, Hull material, Engine, Output, Date of launch	A Cargo ship, BALTIA (Republic of Malta registry), 38,849 tons 9286920 (IMO number), BALTIA NOVA SCHIFFFAHRTS GMBH 225.00m x 32.26m x 19.30m, Steel Diesel engine, 8,973kW, October 2, 2004 B Fishing vessel, RYOHOMARU No.8, 6.6 tons AM2-5608 (fishing vessel registration number), Individual owner 12.61m (Lr) x 3.20m x 1.18m, FRP Diesel engine, 356.72kW, September 25, 1999 No. 212-11772 (Ship Inspection. Completion Slip. Number)
<b>Crew information</b>	A Master A (Republic of Poland registry), male, 50 years No license available


	<p>B Skipper B, male, 45 years  First class boat' s operator and personal water craft operator with passenger service license  Date of issue: December 15, 1998  Date of revalidation: December 27, 2012  (valid until December 14, 2018)</p>
Injuries to persons	<p>A None  B Light wound, one person (skipper B)</p>
Damage to vessel	<p>A Abrasion damage at the starboard stem side  B Damage, etc. at the head</p>
Weather and sea conditions	<p>Meteorological phenomena: weather: rain, wind direction: south, Beaufort number: 3, range of visibility: approximately 2 nautical miles  Sea conditions: wave height: approximately 0.5 meters</p>
Events leading to the accident	<p>Master A and the other 20 crew members were on board vessel A, which had left the United States of America for the Republic of Korea and was moving southwest through the Tsugaru Strait at the speed (speed over the ground; the same shall apply hereinafter) of approximately 11 knots (kn) around 20:00 on November 2, 2015.</p> <p>Vessel A kept moving southwest even after colliding with vessel B, which had come close from the starboard bow, in the west-northwest off Cape Kodomari. Then the Japan Coast Guard provided information on its possible involvement with the accident and asked for an investigation, thus vessel A met a patrol ship off the southwest coast of Cape Henashi, Fukaura Town Aomori Prefecture to cooperate with the investigation.</p> <p>Skipper B and the other crew member were on board vessel B, which engaged in pole-and-line squid fishing in the fishing ground approximately 15 nautical miles away from the west-northwest coast of Cape Kodomari. When they tidied up after the work with the head of the vessel facing east-southeast, skipper B visually recognized an image of vessel A moving southwest, approximately two nautical miles away at 60°on the port bow, in the radar. Then they started to head back for Port Kodomari, Nakadomari Town, around 21:00.</p> <p>Vessel B moved east-southeast at a speed of approximately 10kn under automatic steering, with skipper B standing on the bridge watch alone in the steering house.</p> <p>Skipper B once turned his eyes to vessel A, coming closer from the port side on a path that would cross vessel B on the head side, but</p>

	<p>continued to navigate vessel B by retaining the course and speed while watching the work for sorting out the fish catch at the bow deck. The bow of vessel B and the starboard bow of vessel A collided with each other around 21:09.</p> <p>Vessel B sailed on its own to Port Kodomari after the accident. After entering the port, skipper B, who had been hit in the face, etc. by the impact of the collision, was transferred to the hospital by a car driven by his family member and received treatment.</p> <p>(Refer to Attached figure 1. Outline drawing of course of events, Attached figure 2. Outline drawing of course of events (enlarged) and Appendix table 1. AIS records of vessel A (Abstract).)</p>
Other items	<p>Skipper B believed vessel A, which was a give-way vessel, would avoid vessel B because vessel A was coming close to vessel B from the port side and the courses of both vessels would cross each other.</p>
<p><b>Analysis</b></p> <p>Involvement of crew</p> <p>Involvement of vessel, and engine, etc.</p> <p>Involvement of weather, sea conditions, etc.</p> <p>Analysis of the findings</p>	<p>A: Uncertain, B: Yes</p> <p>A: Uncertain, B: No</p> <p>A: Uncertain, B: No</p> <p>It is probable that vessel A collided with vessel B while moving southeast off the west-northwest coast of Cape Kodomari but it was not possible to obtain information from master A. For this reason, events leading to the accident could not be determined.</p> <p>When vessel B was moving east-southeast off the west-northwest coast of Cape Kodomari, skipper B believed vessel A would avoid vessel B and thus he did not look around but was watching the situation of work for sorting out the fish catch at the bow deck. For this reason, it is probable that he was not aware of vessel A coming close without changing direction and vessel B collided with vessel A.</p> <p>It is probable that skipper B believed vessel A, which was a give-way vessel, would avoid vessel B because vessel A was coming close to vessel B from the port side.</p>
<b>Probable causes</b>	<p>It is probable that this accident happened in the west-northwest off Cape Kodomari during the night when vessel A was moving southwest and vessel B east-southeast and both vessels collided.</p>
<b>Safety actions</b>	<p>It is considered useful that the following measures should be taken for the purpose of prevention of the recurrence of similar accidents.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• If another vessel is seen coming close, continue to watch its movement and take measures to avoid collision while there is still space.</li> </ul>

Attached figure 1. Outline drawing of course of events



Attached figure 2. Outline drawing of course of events (enlarged)



Appendix table 1. AIS records of vessel A (abstract)

Time (hours:min:sec)	Location of vessel*		Course over ground* (°)	Heading* (°)	Speed over ground (kn)
	Latitude (north) (°-' -" )	Longitude (east) (°-' -" )			
20:00:40	41-18-28.3	140-12-09.9	235	233	11.4
20:05:50	41-17-54.3	140-11-06.0	234	233	11.3
20:10:08	41-17-25.9	140-10-13.3	234	233	11.2
20:15:00	41-16-53.7	140-09-14.3	234	233	11.2
20:20:00	41-16-20.5	140-08-13.8	234	233	11.3
20:25:09	41-15-46.0	140-07-11.5	233	232	11.4
20:30:19	41-15-10.8	140-06-09.2	233	232	11.3
20:34:59	41-14-38.8	140-05-12.4	233	232	11.3
20:40:09	41-14-03.9	140-04-09.5	234	232	11.3
20:44:59	41-13-31.0	140-03-10.9	231	230	11.3
20:49:59	41-12-55.7	140-02-12.4	230	230	11.3
20:55:00	41-12-20.2	140-01-13.5	231	230	11.3
21:00:00	41-11-45.5	140-00-13.7	232	232	11.4
21:00:58	41-11-38.8	140-00-01.9	233	232	11.4
21:01:58	41-11-32.0	139-59-49.7	233	233	11.4
21:03:08	41-11-24.0	139-59-35.3	233	233	11.4
21:03:58	41-11-18.6	139-59-25.3	234	233	11.3
21:04:58	41-11-11.9	139-59-13.2	233	233	11.3
21:05:58	41-11-05.2	139-59-00.7	235	234	11.3
21:07:00	41-10-58.6	139-58-48.1	235	234	11.3
21:08:00	41-10-52.0	139-58-36.2	233	243	11.4
21:09:00	41-10-46.9	139-58-22.5	246	244	11.0
21:10:00	41-10-42.3	139-58-09.4	247	251	11.0
21:11:00	41-10-38.9	139-57-55.6	252	253	11.1
21:12:00	41-10-35.6	139-57-40.9	253	251	11.1
21:12:58	41-10-32.5	139-57-27.6	251	249	11.0
21:13:58	41-10-28.9	139-57-14.0	251	252	11.1
21:14:59	41-10-25.5	139-56-59.5	252	251	11.1
21:15:58	41-10-22.3	139-56-45.7	253	251	11.1
21:16:59	41-10-18.9	139-56-31.7	250	244	11.0
21:17:58	41-10-14.2	139-56-18.7	240	235	10.8
21:18:58	41-10-08.3	139-56-07.5	233	231	10.9

(Note) The vessel position is the coordinate of the GPS antenna installed at the top of the bridge of boats. The course over the ground and heading are at true bearing.