



## INTERIM SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT

202006/006

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The Merchant Shipping (Accident and Incident Safety Investigation) Regulations, 2011 prescribe that the sole objective of marine safety investigations carried out in accordance with the regulations, including analysis, conclusions, and recommendations, which either result from them or are part of the process thereof, shall be the prevention of future marine accidents and incidents through the ascertainment of causes, contributing factors and circumstances.

Moreover, it is not the purpose of marine safety investigations carried out in accordance with these regulations to apportion blame or determine civil and criminal liabilities.

### NOTE

This interim safety investigation report is not written with litigation in mind and pursuant to Regulation 13(7) of the Merchant Shipping (Accident and Incident Safety Investigation) Regulations, 2011, shall be inadmissible in any judicial proceedings whose purpose or one of whose purposes is to attribute or apportion liability or blame, unless, under prescribed conditions, a Court determines otherwise.

The interim safety investigation report may therefore be misleading if used for purposes other than the promulgation of safety lessons.

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### *MV Margarete Schulte* Fatal injury to stevedore in the port of Manzanillo, Panama 10 June 2020

### SUMMARY

In the early hours of 10 June 2020, whilst *Margarete Schulte* was loading cargo at the port of Manzanillo, Panama, the crew members were alerted by shore personnel that a stevedore was trapped between a stowed container and the reefer receptacle guardrails in bay 46. Later, it was confirmed that the stevedore had lost his life.

During the preliminary assessment of this accident, the Marine Safety Investigation Unit (MSIU) discussed and agreed with the Marine Accident Investigation Department of the Panama Maritime Authority that Panama

would lead the safety investigation, in accordance with the IMO Casualty Investigation Code.

On 30 April 2021, the MSIU was informed that the Marine Accident Investigation Department had not yet completed its safety investigation. To this extent, the MSIU was unable to close the safety investigation within the 12-month period prescribed in S.L. 234.49.

This document is an interim safety investigation report, published in terms of regulation 13(1) of S.L. 234.49.



## NOTICE

The information contained in this interim safety investigation report is derived from the initial notification and subsequent investigation of the occurrence to date. Readers are cautioned that there is the possibility that new evidence, which may alter the circumstances as depicted in this interim safety investigation report, may become available during the course of the safety investigation.

## FACTUAL INFORMATION

### Vessel

*Margarete Schulte* (Figure 1) was a 26,671 gt container vessel, with a container carrying capacity of 2,600 TEU (twenty-foot equivalent unit). The vessel was owned by Host Wealth Ltd. and managed by Bernhard Schulte Shipmanagement (India) Pvt. Ltd., India. She was built by STX Shipbuilding Co. Ltd., Republic of Korea, in 2006 and was classed with the Korean Register of Shipping (KR).

The vessel had a length overall of 210.0 m, a moulded breadth of 30.1 m, a moulded depth of 16.7 m and a summer draught of 11.5 m. At the time of the occurrence, her forward draught was recorded as 10.35 m, while her aft draught was recorded as 10.40 m.

Propulsive power was provided by an eight-cylinder, two-stroke, single-acting, slow speed, STX MAN-B&W 8S70MC-C marine diesel engine, which produced 24,880 kW at 91 rpm. This drove a fixed-pitch propeller, enabling *Margarete Schulte* to reach an estimated speed of 22 knots.

*Margarete Schulte* was designed to carry containers inside her five cargo holds, located forward of the accommodation, as well as on deck, in bays numbering from 01 to 47. Bay nos. 41 to 47 were located aft of the accommodation. In the lowermost tier (tier 82) of bay 45, only 20-foot containers

could be loaded. The vessel was also fitted with four cargo cranes for the loading / unloading of containers.



Figure 1: Extract of *Margarete Schulte*'s GA Plan

## Crew

*Margarete Schulte's* Minimum Safe Manning Certificate stipulated a crew of 15. At the time of the accident, the vessel was manned by 23 crew members. The crew members were Ukrainian, Russian, Indian, Ghanaian, Latvian, Indonesian and Filipino nationals.

## Environment

On the day of the occurrence, the weather was reportedly clear, with a visibility of about five nautical miles. A wind measuring Force 2 on the Beaufort scale was blowing from the South Southeast and the sea was calm. The air and sea temperatures were recorded as 28 °C and 27 °C, respectively.

## Narrative<sup>1</sup>

On 09 June 2020, at around 0612, *Margarete Schulte* had berthed at the port of Manzanillo, Panama, with her starboard side along the pier. Cargo loading operations commenced about half an hour later, by shore gantry cranes. Personnel from a local stevedoring company were deployed to lash the containers being loaded on board.


At around midnight, the third officer, an able seafarer – deck (AB) and an ordinary seafarer (OS) were relieved from their cargo watch, by the second officer, another AB and an OS. At this time, shore gantry crane no. 10 was loading containers in bays 42 to 46.

After taking over the watch, the duty AB checked the cargo lashings of the 40-foot containers loaded in bay 42. He noticed that the lashings in the forward part of the bay were slack. He therefore advised the shore cargo supervisor to arrange for those to be tightened. Soon after, the duty AB was called by the second officer to bay 02 to

check the lashings of the containers loaded there.

At around 0045, whilst inside the vessel's office, the third officer felt the vessel shudder violently. Soon after, he heard shouts from the main deck. The second officer and duty AB were in the meantime checking the container lashings at bay 02, while the duty OS was manning the gangway.


The third officer rushed out to the deck to investigate. A shore security guard, stationed at the vessel's gangway near the accommodation block, informed him of an accident involving a stevedore, forward of bay 46 (Figure 2). The third officer immediately notified the second officer, followed by the chief officer and the master, who were in their respective cabins.




**Figure 2: Location of the accident**

On reaching the accident site, the second officer and duty AB noticed that a 20-foot container, loaded in bay 45, row 02, tier 82 (450282), and a 40-foot container loaded above it (460282) had slid forward from their stowage positions. Consequently, a stevedore who was working forward of bay 45 was entrapped between the 20-foot container and the guardrails of a reefer receptacle (Figures 3 and 4).

<sup>1</sup> Unless specified otherwise, all times mentioned in this safety investigation report are in local time (LT = UTC - 5).



**Figure 3: Accident dynamics (the red containers shifted forward from their stowage positions)**



**Figure 4: The reefer receptacle with guardrails**

Soon after, the local port authorities boarded the vessel and advised the crew members to stay clear of the accident site, as the local police would be boarding to investigate the accident.

At around 0105, a shore service team boarded the vessel to replace the spreader of no. 10 shore gantry crane and by 0200, the spreader was replaced, after which, the gantry crane was tested. At around 0435, the two containers which had shifted were unloaded from the vessel.



At around 0518, the local authorities disembarked from the vessel and proceeded to the morgue. Thereafter, the master and chief officer inspected the accident site and found that two deck container sockets in the aft part of bay 46, row 02, tier 84 (460284) were damaged (Figure 5).

At around 0718, cargo loading operations were resumed and, on completion, the vessel departed from the port of Manzanillo at around 1542.



Figure 5: Damaged deck container sockets

### Safety investigation activities

The Marine Accident Investigation Department of the Panama Maritime Authority notified the MSIU of the accident, on 11 June 2020. Immediately after, the MSIU made requests for the preservation and collection of information from *Margarete Schulte*. The information received from the vessel indicated that the crew members of *Margarete Schulte* were neither involved in the operations which resulted in the accident, nor did they witness it.

During the preliminary assessment phase, the MSIU liaised with the Marine Accident Investigation Department of the Panama Maritime Authority. On 19 June 2020, it was mutually agreed that the Marine Accident Investigation Department would lead the safety investigation into this accident, with Malta being considered as a substantially interested State.

The safety investigation will be analysing the dynamics of the events leading to the accident.

## SHIP PARTICULARS

Vessel Name:	<i>Margarete Schulte</i>
Flag:	Malta
Classification Society:	Korean Register of Shipping (KR)
IMO Number:	9302944
Type:	Container vessel
Registered Owner:	Host Wealth Ltd.
Managers:	Bernhard Schulte Shipmanagement (India) Pvt. Ltd.
Construction:	Steel
Length Overall:	210.0 m
Registered Length:	200.35 m
Gross Tonnage:	26,671
Minimum Safe Manning:	15
Authorised Cargo:	Containerised cargo

## VOYAGE PARTICULARS

Port of Departure:	Balboa, Panama
Port of Arrival:	Manzanillo, Panama
Type of Voyage:	Internal voyage
Cargo Information:	In ballast – 6,886 mt
Manning:	23

## MARINE OCCURRENCE INFORMATION

Date and Time:	10 June 2020, at 0045 LT
Classification of Occurrence:	Very Serious Marine Casualty
Location of Occurrence:	Manzanillo, Panama
Place on Board	Open deck cargo space
Injuries / Fatalities:	One fatality
Damage / Environmental Impact:	Minor damages / None
Ship Operation:	Moored; loading cargo from shore to ship.
Voyage Segment:	Alongside
External & Internal Environment:	Clear night, with a visibility of about five nautical miles. South Southeasterly wind, measuring Force 2 on the Beaufort scale, and calm sea. Air and sea temperatures: 28 °C and 27 °C, respectively.
Persons on board:	Not available