



# NIGERIAN MARITIME ADMINISTRATION AND SAFETY AGENCY

## Marine Safety Investigation Report on The Collision of *MSC CORUNA* with *MFT OLOKUN XII* Along Lagos Channel on 07<sup>th</sup> November, 2022



### **Safety Investigation Report**

NIMASA-MAI-SIR-23-04

Report Completed: 04<sup>th</sup> October, 2023

## CONDOLENCES

The Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency offers its heartfelt condolences to the family and friends of those who died as a result of the collision of *MSC CORUNA* with *MFT OLOKUN XII* along Lagos Channel, Nigeria on 07th of November, 2022.



### Safety Investigation Report

NIMASA-MAI-SIR-23-04

Report Completed: 04<sup>th</sup> October, 2023

## DISCLAIMER

This report is not written with litigation in mind. In line with chapter 1 of the IMO's Casualty Investigation Code and international best practices on safety investigations, the purpose of this safety investigation report is to avert future occurrence of the same or similar incident. As such, we do not recommend or authorise its use as evidence in any judicial proceedings whose purpose (or one of whose purposes) is to attribute or apportion liability or blame.

Whilst the Agency's Marine Accident Investigation (MAI) Unit has objectively carried out this investigation with circumspection to ensure that the information contained in this report is accurate, the Agency indemnifies its Organization, investigators, employees, representatives, or associates of any liability for any outcomes, conclusions and findings contained herein, or for any error or non-inclusion, alleged to be contained herein.

Excerpts from this report may be published without explicit authorization provided that the source is duly referenced and acknowledged; else, it is required that the Agency's approval is obtained before reproduction of this report.



### Safety Investigation Report

NIMASA-MAI-SIR-23-04

Report Completed: 04<sup>th</sup> October, 2023

## INCIDENT INVESTIGATION CHARTER

### The charter of the investigation team was to:

1. Establish what happened and sequence of events;
2. Establish the causal factors and root cause(s) of the incident;
3. Develop effective corrective actions to prevent re-occurrence;
4. Develop the incident investigation report;
5. Ensure that lessons learned from the incident will be shared with the maritime industry stakeholders, and applied where appropriate.

In this report, the investigation team provides a summarized account of the incident, key findings, lessons learned and recommendations.

This safety investigation was carried out in line with the provisions of Regulation 6, Chapter XI-1 of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the Code of International Standards and Recommended Practices for a Safety Investigation into a Marine Casualty or Marine Incident (Casualty Investigation Code): Resolution MSC.255 (84).



### Safety Investigation Report

NIMASA-MAI-SIR-23-04

Report Completed: 04<sup>th</sup> October, 2023

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

CONDOLENCES.....	i
DISCLAIMER .....	ii
INCIDENT INVESTIGATION CHARTER.....	1
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS.....	4
FACTUAL INFORMATION.....	6
PARTICULARS OF MSC CORUNA .....	6
PARTICULARS OF MFT OLOKUN XII .....	7
VOYAGE PARTICULARS OF MSC CORUNA.....	8
VOYAGE PARTICULARS OF MFT OLOKUN XII.....	8
MARINE CASUALTY INFORMATION .....	9
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MSC CORUNA.....	10
DESCRIPTION OF MFT OLOKUN XII.....	11
EVENTS LEADING TO THE INCIDENT.....	14
INCIDENT NARRATIVE .....	15
POST INCIDENT EVENTS: SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATION.....	18
FINDINGS FROM THE SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT .....	19
ANALYSIS OF DATA .....	27
ROOT CAUSE(S) OF THE INCIDENT.....	27



### Safety Investigation Report

NIMASA-MAI-SIR-23-04

Report Completed: 04<sup>th</sup> October, 2023

CONTRIBUTORY CAUSE(S) OF THE INCIDENT.....28

RECOMMENDATIONS..... 30

LESSONS LEARNED.....32

CONCLUSION..... 33

APPENDIX: EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND SHORE AUTHORITY  
INVOLVEMENT..... 34



## GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

S/N	ABBREVIATION /ACRONYMS	MEANING
1.	AIS	Automatic Identification System
2.	ARPA	Automatic Radar Plotting Aid
3.	COLREGs	Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972
4.	ECDIS	Electronic Chart Display and Information System
5.	FOB	Forward Operational Base
6.	GMDSS	Global Maritime Distress and Safety System
7.	GPS	Global Positioning System
8.	IMO	International Maritime Organization
9.	ISM	International Safety Management
10.	MFT	Motor Fishing Trawler
11.	MSC	Mediterranean Shipping Company
12.	MSC	Maritime Safety Committee
13.	MT	Metric Tonnes
14.	NIMASA	Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency
15.	RPM	Revolution per Minute
16.	SMS	Safety Management System
17.	SOLAS	Safety of Life at Sea



### Safety Investigation Report

NIMASA-MAI-SIR-23-04

Report Completed: 04<sup>th</sup> October, 2023

18.	TEU	Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit
19.	VHF	Very High Frequency
20.	VTS	Vessel Traffic Services



**Safety Investigation Report**

NIMASA-MAI-SIR-23-04

Report Completed: 04<sup>th</sup> October, 2023



## FACTUAL INFORMATION

PARTICULARS OF <i>MSC CORUNA</i>	
NAME	MSC CORUNA
IMO NUMBER	9480215
FLAG	MALTA
CALL SIGN	9HA5725
YEAR OF BUILD	2011
PLACE OF BUILD	ROMANIA
CLASS	DNV GL
OWNERS	KG MS "COP VALENCIA"
OWNER'S ADDRESS	OFFEN REEDEREI, HAMBURG/GERMANY
LENGTH OVERALL	270.40 METERS
MOULDED BREADTH	40.00 METERS
MOULDED DEPTH	13.50 METRES
GROSS TONNAGE	61,870 METRIC TONNES
SUMMER DEADWEIGHT	35,409 METRIC TONNES
MAIN PROPULSION ENGINE(S)	MAN B&W 7K98 (1×42140KW)



### Safety Investigation Report

NIMASA-MAI-SIR-23-04

Report Completed: 04<sup>th</sup> October, 2023

<b>PARTICULARS OF MFT OLOKUN XII</b>	
NAME	MFT OLOKUN XII
IMO NUMBER	8778316
FLAG	NIGERIA
CALL SIGN	N/A
YEAR OF BUILD	2016
PLACE OF BUILD	ALABAMA, U.S.A
CLASS	N/A
OWNERS	OLOKUN PISCES LIMITED
OWNER'S ADDRESS	PLOT C, OBA GANIYU ODESANYA WAY, OTTO, IJORA OLOPA, LAGOS, NIGERIA
LENGTH OVERALL	25.30 METERS
MOULDED BREADTH	07.32 METERS
MOULDED DEPTH	03.66 METERS
GROSS TONNAGE	130.00 METRIC TONNES
NET TONNAGE	45.00 METRIC TONNES
MAIN PROPULSION ENGINE(S)	CATERPILLAR (1×458.79KW)



<b>VOYAGE PARTICULARS OF <i>MSC CORUNA</i></b>	
PORT OF DEPARTURE	N/A
PORT OF ARRIVAL	LAGOS
TYPE OF VOYAGE	INTERNATIONAL
PERSONS ONBOARD	30

<b>VOYAGE PARTICULARS OF <i>MFT OLOKUN XII</i></b>	
PORT OF DEPARTURE	WARRI
PORT OF ARRIVAL	LAGOS
TYPE OF VOYAGE	NEAR COASTER
PERSONS ONBOARD	12



**Safety Investigation Report**

NIMASA-MAI-SIR-23-04

Report Completed: 04<sup>th</sup> October, 2023

<b>MARINE CASUALTY INFORMATION</b>	
NATURE OF INCIDENT	COLLISION
DATE AND TIME	07 <sup>TH</sup> NOVEMBER, 2022/ 0721HRS
TYPE OF MARINE CASUALTY	VERY SERIOUS
LOCATION OF INCIDENT	LAGOS CHANNEL
PART OF SHIP AFFECTED	MFT OLOKUN CAPSIZED AND SANK
INJURIES AND FATALITIES	TWO CREW MEMEBERS DIED
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT	TRAWLER'S WRECK YET TO BE RECOVERED
TYPE OF OPERATION	PASSAGE/TOWAGE
WEATHER AT TIME OF INCIDENT	CALM SEA, GOOD VISIBILITY
PERSONS ONBOARD	30 PERSONS ONBOARD MSC CORUNA/12 PERSONS ONBOARD <i>MFT OLOKUN XII</i>



**Safety Investigation Report**

NIMASA-MAI-SIR-23-04

Report Completed: 04<sup>th</sup> October, 2023

## BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MSC CORUNA

MSC CORUNA is a 61,870MT container ship built in 2011 in Romania, sailing under the Malta flag and currently classed by DNV GL. She has a carrying capacity of 5582 TEU with 3260 TEU on Deck and 2322 TEU below Deck. The vessels net tonnage is 35,409MT, with a displacement of 97,054MT, a dead weight of 74,477MT and a light weight of 22,576MT. Her length overall is about 270.41 meters, width of 40.05 meters, moulded depth of about 13.50 meters with approximately 10 meters summer draught

The vessel has one fixed pitch propeller of thickness 8.2 mm and one controllable pitch Bow Thruster of 2000KW which are powered by a main engine MAN B&W with capacity of 42140KW and 4 auxiliary diesel generators, 2 STX8 of 2640KW and 2 STX8 with 2310KW respectively.

The vessel has a compliment of navigational equipment including 2 ARPA Radar (X and S Band), 2 ECDIS, 2 GPS, 1 AIS, 1 Echo Sounder, 1 Auto Pilot, 1 Course Recorder, 2 Gyro Compass, 1 Magnetic Compass, 3 VHF Radio, 4 GMDSS Handheld Radios, 2 Satcom and 1 Navtex.



### Safety Investigation Report

NIMASA-MAI-SIR-23-04

Report Completed: 04<sup>th</sup> October, 2023

## DISCRIPTION OF MFT OLOKUN XII

MFT OLOKUN XII is a 130MT steel welded, single screwed and diesel powered shrimper, built in the United States of America. The vessel had five transverse bulkheads. The main deck had a deckhouse at the forward, a mast and rigging amidships with work area on deck in the aft. She was built in 2017 and engaged in commercial fishing activities within the West African sub-region.



Picture 1: MFT OLOKUN XII

The vessel had compliments of the navigational equipment including navigation lights, steering wheel, morse propulsion engine and transmission controls, magnetic compass, single trumpet electric horn, searchlight, HF/SSB transceiver, weather facsimile receiver, radar, color video sounders, Furuno 520-5MSD 50/200 KHz transducers, Furuno GPS receiver, Freeman autopilot, ComNav autopilot, 406 MHz EPIRB, station intercom system, Standard hailer, etc.

The safety equipment onboard include: 14 Type I Life Vests fitted with strobe lights & whistles, Distress Flare Kit, First Aid Kit, Ship's Bell, Ring Buoys, one (1) fitted with 90' tether, 406 MHz EPIRB, Zodiac 16 person SOLAS 'A' Life Raft.

*MFT OLOKUN XII* was powered by a single Caterpillar 12 cylinder, 4 cycle turbo-charged diesel engine rated at 624/465 HP/KW @ 1800 RPM. The engine drives a single 4-bladed 71" diameter x 74" fixed pitch Hung Shen bronze propeller inside a 72" Kort nozzle via a 5" Aquamet 18 stainless steel tail shaft, 5" cold roll steel intermediate shaft and a Twin Disc marine gear (transmission).


She is also equipped with one (1) 85 KW 380 VAC, 3-phase, 50 hertz generator rated at 127/95 HP/KW @ 1500 RPM.



### Safety Investigation Report

NIMASA-MAI-SIR-23-04

Report Completed: 04<sup>th</sup> October, 2023



Picture 2: Architectural Plan of MFT OLOKUN XII



## EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE INCIDENTS

Prior to the incident, *MFT OLOKUN XII* developed engine faults while she was fishing off Pennington Area at a position (004 38.5N, 005 22.1E) which is about 155NM from Lagos.

The company engaged a sister trawler (*MFT OLOKUN IV*) to tow *MFT OLOKUN XII* from the location to Lagos. The sister trawler commenced the towage operation at about 1445hrs on 05<sup>th</sup> November, 2022, maintaining a length of tow of about 150m. She arrived the Lagos Anchorage on 07<sup>th</sup> November, 2022, and she was granted permission to proceed inward into the Lagos Channel by the Nigerian Port Authority at about 0645hrs.




### Safety Investigation Report

NIMASA-MAI-SIR-23-04

Report Completed: 04<sup>th</sup> October, 2023

## INCIDENT NARRATIVE

On 07<sup>th</sup> November, 2022 and at about 0721hrs, a Malta-flagged container vessel (IMO NO: 9480215) made contact with a Nigerian-flagged fishing trawler *MFT OLOKUN XII* (IMO No: 8778316) while under tow by a sister vessel *MFT OLOKUN IV* along the Lagos Channel, resulting in the capsizing and eventual sinking of the trawler (*MFT OLOKUN XII*).



Picture 3: Chart showing location of incident

Prior to the accident, *MSC CORUNA* was laden with containers, embarked a Pilot at about 0700hrs at the Lagos Anchorage and began to proceed inwards. Meanwhile, *MFT OLOKUN XII* (having lost engine power) was being towed inwards in the Lagos Channel by a sister trawler (*MFT OLOKUN IV*). The length of tow line was estimated to be about 150 meters.

When *MSC CORUNA* was about to pass the breakwater, she sighted three fishing trawlers ahead along the narrow Channel. She whistled to alert the trawlers.

Her speed of approach was about 7 – 8 knots; this, according to the Master of *MSC CORUNA*, was to enable her pass through the Channel without being drifted to shallow parts by the attendant sea current along the Channel.

According to the Captain and Pilot onboard *MSC CORUNA*, it appeared that the towing trawler had decided to keep to the portside of the Channel, when she suddenly altered her course back to the starboard of the Channel, keeping *MFT OLOKUN XII* on the port side.

*MSC CORUNA* was still whistling to the trawlers and at this time oblivious of the ongoing towing operation and towing line in-between the two trawlers. Meanwhile, the alteration in *MFT OLOKUN IV*'s course created room in-between the two trawlers where *MSC CORUNA* thought she could quickly pass through along the deepest part of the Channel, to avoid grounding. In the process, *MSC CORUNA* made contact with towing line between the trawlers and dragged *MFT OLOKUN XII* resulting in capsizing and flipping over of the trawler at about 0721hrs as shown in picture 4 (Lat.06°24.5'N. Long.003° 24.0'E).



### Safety Investigation Report

NIMASA-MAI-SIR-23-04

Report Completed: 04<sup>th</sup> October, 2023



**Picture 4: MFT OLOKUN XII capsized and flipped over after the impact**

While the search and rescue was going on, MSC CORUNA proceeded inwards to Berth 3 of Tin Can Island Container Terminal where she was berthed.

The unfortunate incident resulted in the loss of two (2) crew members, one (1) Indian and one (1) Nigerian, whose bodies were later recovered by a search team.

## POST INCIDENT EVENTS: SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATION

The Nigerian Navy Forward Operational Base (FOB), Takwa Bay was close to the incident location and the Navy personnel responded in the shortest possible time. They conducted search and rescue operation along with other boat operators within the vicinity. As such, ten (10) out of the twelve (12) crew members onboard *MFT OLOKUN XII* were rescued.

At the end of the search and rescue operation, two (2) crew members were missing. The rescued crew members were conveyed to the Naval Base Clinic for immediate medical attention.



## FINDINGS FROM THE SAFETY INVESTIGATION

### 1. COMPLIANCE TO COLLISION REGULATIONS (COLREGS)

MSC *CORUNA*, while approaching the breakwater inbound, had pilot onboard and a lookout posted at the forward station. According to the Master, there were two fishing trawlers sighted in the channel; however, there was no towing signal and towing line sighted to determine that they were proceeding under tow. Consequently MSC *CORUNA* did not act with regards to the condition of the trawlers, instead resorted to passing between them, thereby dragging them along. Some of the provisions of the rules affected are as follows:

**Rule No. 9** - Narrow Channel (The incident occurred in a narrow channel): In line with rule 9 of the collision regulations, every vessel is required to keep to the outer limit of the channel which lie on her starboard side as it is safe and practicable. The two fishing trawlers were found in the middle of the channel. On sighting MSC *CORUNA*, MFT *OLOKUN IV* which was the towing vessel began to pull MFT *OLOKUN XII* to the starboard side. It was however, impracticable to move the towed vessel quickly, considering the long length of tow and the short time involved.

It is important to note that the two fishing vessels were above 20 meters, and therefore, do not fall within the range of vessels required not to impede the safe passage of other vessels, which can only safely navigate within a narrow channel.

**Rule 7 & 8:** The Fishing trawlers (especially the towing trawler) did not take adequate measures to determine risk or prevent collision as required by the rules. There were functional AIS, Radar and other aids



to navigation but were not being utilize in the determination of risk of collision.

According to the crew of MFT OLOKUN XII, they noticed an approaching vessel visually but it was too late for the towing trawler to pull the towed to the side of the channel.

The Captain of the towing trawler insisted that the vessel had displayed a day light towing signal (Diamond shape). Investigators sighted a diamond shape displayed onboard during the investigation (see picture 5 below).

MSC CORUNA's Actions taken to prevent collision were based on the assumptions that the two vessels were not involved in a towing operation, hence, contributing to the incident.





**Picture 5: Displayed towing signal on MFT OLOKUN IV**


**Rule 13** - Overtaking in Narrow Channels: *MSC CORUNA* was overtaking the two fishing trawlers in the Channel and had the responsibility to give way for the trawlers. In doing so, she was required to take necessary measures to avoid collision including sounding appropriate sound signals as required by Rule 34, and to obtain required response.

However, according to the Master of *MSC CORUNA*, he was not clearly aware of the status of the trawlers (as he did not sight a towing signal or towing line) on the fishing vessels, hence could not take necessary measures to prevent collision.



## 2. NATURE OF THE CHANNEL

The Lagos pilotage district channel is an inland navigation channel. The entrance to the Channel has the 'great wall of Lagos (Eko Atlantic city) on the starboard side for inbound traffic, and the Takwa Bay beach on the port side. The incident occurred between Breakwater and Atlas Cove Jetty. The maximum breadth at the location of incident is about 440m while the deeper side of the Channel (being the middle of the Channel) is about 14.5 meters deep with a minimum permissible under keel clearance of 0.5 meters.



Picture 6: Description of the Lagos Channel

In view of the nature of the channel, and the effect of current, the Nigerian Ports Authority approved a speed limit of 7 – 8 knots for both in and outbound traffic in this location.



Picture 7: Lagos Channel (Source: Eko Atlantic City Website)

### 3. VESSEL TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT ALONG THE CHANNEL

The Apapa port pilotage district is a very busy Channel that covers Apapa and Tincan Island ports and other adjoining private terminals and jetties housing very heavy traffic of different types of vessels and operations including fishing vessels, oil tanker operations, container traffic, car ferries, etc.


The entire vessels traffic management within the Apapa Channel, the approaches and all other Nigerian Ports is the responsibility of the Nigerian Ports Authority. The Port Authority monitors and maintains constant communications with vessels to ensure the free flow of traffic within the Channel. The Port Authority maintains communications with pilots, tug masters and vessels on VHF Channels 12, 14 and 16.

Port communication with the fishing trawler commenced at 0645hrs on 07<sup>th</sup> November, 2022 (which was the time of the vessel received permission to proceed inward).


Furthermore, the Lagos Channel is monitored by radio communications, and as at the time of the incident, there was no additional layer of monitoring by a more advanced system that is capable of measuring real time images and plotting of vessels along the Channel.



## SHIP ARRIVAL AND BERTHING



## SHIP ARRIVAL AND BERTHING... continued.



**Pictures 8: NPA's Port Traffic Management Plan (Source: Nigerian Port Process Manual -2020)**

#### 4. MFT OLOKUN IV AND MFT OLOKUN XII TOWAGE OPERATION

*MFT OLOKUN IV* commenced towing of *MFT OLOKUN XII* Pennington Offshore to Lagos, when the sister vessel lost power and was not under command.

She arrived the Lagos Anchorage with a tow line of about 150m and proceeded inward into the Channel without adjusting the length of tow neither considered the possibility of the towing line affecting her ability to maneuver *MFT OLOKUN XII* adequately in case of emergencies along the Channel.

At the time *MSC CORUNA* was proceeding inwards, she whistled so the fishing trawlers would give way. Meanwhile, the towing trawler was in the process of adjusting the towing lines and to move the vessels to starboard side of the Channel. The situation became quite difficult for the two trawlers to move to the starboard side and give way because of the proximity of *MSC CORUNA* and the short time to complete the adjustment of the towing lines.

As a result, they decide to disconnect the tow lines when they observed *MSC CORUNA*'s intention to pass freely in-between the two trawlers. However, the decision to disconnect *MFT OLOKUN XII* from *MFT OLOKUN IV* was too late as the impact took place just when the disconnection was completed.

## **ANALYSIS OF DATA**

### **AIM**

The purpose of the analysis is to determine the root cause(s), contributory cause(s) and circumstance(s) leading to the incident as a basis for making recommendations and deriving safety lessons to prevent re-occurrence.

### **ROOT CAUSE(S) OF THE INCIDENT**

#### **1. UNSAFE TOWAGE OPERATION ALONG THE CHANNEL**

Towage operations are extremely risky operations that should be carried out with all sense of responsibility and diligence.

Before commencing any towing operation, a comprehensive plan of action (part of the ship's port passage plan) should be prepared and agreed by all the parties involved, taking cognizance of all relevant factors including tide, wind, visibility, the ship's size, type and characteristics, berth operator's requirements, traffic density, etc. Vessels engaged in towing are obligated to display appropriate day/night signal during towing operation.

*MFT OLOKUN IV* arrived the Lagos Anchorage with a long tow line of about 150m. She then proceeded inward into the narrow Channel without proper planning and assessing its impact on her manoeuvrability and the traffic density in the Channel, etc.

Whilst in the Channel, the two fishing trawlers were adjusting the tow lines to reduce the length for ease of manoeuvrability. As *MSC CORUNA* approached and whistled, there was loss of situational awareness; instead of moving to the starboard side of the Channel in line with the provisions of Rule 9 of COLREGs, the towing trawler moved to the port side before she began to pull the sister vessel to



the starboard side, creating confusion and was unable to pull the vessel with her away from the path of *MSC CORUNA*.

In addition, *MSC CORUNA* was unaware of the status of the vessels being under tow as the Master said he could not sight the signal nor the adjoining towing line. He decided to pass in-between the two trawlers, eventually leading to the incident.

## CONTRIBUTORY CAUSE(S) OF THE INCIDENT

### 1. NATURE OF THE CHANNEL

The Lagos Channel is an inland navigation channel, housing a busy traffic. The channel complies with IALA Buoyage system region A, and is equipped with waterways services and navigational installations such as buoys, light houses, etc.

The incident occurred between the Breakwater to Atlas Cove Jetty (on the portside). The maximum breadth at the location of incident is about 440 meters while the deeper side of the channel being the middle of the channel is about 14.5 meters deep with a minimum permissible under-keel clearance of 0.5 meters.

### 2. NON COMPLIANCE TO COLLISION REGULATIONS

As required by Rule 9 of COLREGs, *MFT OLOKUN IV* and *MFT OLOKUN XII* were required to keep to the outer limit of the Channel, which lie on the starboard side; instead, the two trawlers were proceeding/adjusting lines in the middle of the Channel.

On the other hand, Rule 13 of COLREGs places the responsibility of “give way” on vessels overtaking. In this regard, *MSC CORUNA* was approaching the two fishing trawlers who



were already in the Channel. *MSC CORUNA*, being the overtaking vessel, was required to take necessary actions to keep clear of the trawlers. These actions include (but not limited to) sounding appropriate signals and obtaining the required response/understanding. A radio call to determine the intentions of the trawlers would have also assisted to understand their navigational status regarding the towage. Thus, the failure of the vessels involved to adhere to the above rules contributed to the incident.

The outer limits of the channel are shallower constituting danger for vessels with bigger drafts, which have to keep as practicable to the middle of the Channel as possible.

In view of this, it was impracticable for *MSC CORUNA* to keep to the outer limits of the Channel as much as possible due to her draft.



### **Safety Investigation Report**

NIMASA-MAI-SIR-23-04

Report Completed: 04<sup>th</sup> October, 2023



## RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Nigerian Maritime Administration is Recommended to :
  - ii. Liaise with the owners of *MFT OLOKUN XII* to establish the current location and determine the danger posed by the wreck to the safety of navigation and the environment, and to also commence the process of removal of the wreck in line with the provisions of the Nigerian Merchant Shipping Act, 2007.
  - iii. Ratify international instruments related to Fishing Vessels including the Torremolinos International Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels, 1977 (and its subsequent Protocol of 1993) and ILO Work in Fishing Convention 2007, which will help address issues of safety and working conditions on fishing vessels/trawlers in Nigeria.
2. The Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) is recommended to:
  - i. Urgently review their guidelines for pilotage and port entry to include the need for companies to develop towing procedures, towing plan, notify relevant authorities and maintain effective communications and constant update of positions throughout towage operations within Nigerian channels.
  - ii. Consider, as an additional layer of monitoring within the Channel, the acquisition of a more advanced system that is capable of capturing real time images, tracking and plotting of vessel movements along the Channel. This may assist to determine risk of collisions, and thus, advise preventive actions.



- iii. Consider the establishment of special rules/additional signals for vessels engaged in fishing or proceeding under tow within the Nigerian channels for ease of identification to enhance safety of navigation within the channels.

3. The Owners of *MFT OLOKUN IV* and *MFT OLOKUN XII* are recommended to:

- i. Ensure the development/implementation of a safety management system that establishes procedures for key shipboard operations including towing, fishing as well as measures to prevent incidents on-board ships.
- ii. Ensure adequate pre-towage planning and relevant parties are notified of towage operations.
- iii. Ensure that crew members are trained on effective risk management, and are also familiarised with the provisions of collision regulations at sea.
- iv. Ensure that the deceased are adequately compensated in line with the Nigerian Workmen Compensation Act.

4. The Owners of *MSC CORUNA*:

Ensure crew adequate familiarization and adherence to the provisions of the COLREGs 1972.



## LESSONS LEARNED FROM SAFETY INVESTIGATION

1. The need for effective towage planning, which should include risk assessments especially when towing in narrow and busy channels, or in confined areas.
2. The need for crew members to always ensure adequate compliance with the provisions of COLREGs. It is pertinent for vessels to display appropriate signals in conspicuous locations. Administrations may also adopt additional signals for ease of identification and safe navigation especially within the narrow and busy inland/narrow channels.
3. The need for port authorities to, as an additional layer of monitoring and preventive measures, consider the acquisition of more advanced monitoring systems with the capacity to capture real time images, track and plot vessel movements along narrow and busy channel accommodating different vessel sizes.



### Safety Investigation Report

NIMASA-MAI-SIR-23-04

Report Completed: 04<sup>th</sup> October, 2023

## CONCLUSION

The safety investigation into this incident was carried out in line with the provisions of the IMO Casualty Investigation Code [MSC. 255(84)]. **The findings from the investigations should not be read as apportioning blame or liability directly or indirectly to any party or organization concerned.**

Recommendations addressing the root cause(s) and findings from the investigation have been conveyed to the concerned parties with a view to forestalling re-occurrence(s) of similar accidents/incidents.

Lessons learned from the incident will be conveyed to maritime industry stakeholders through Safety bulletins, flyers, etc. The lessons are being scheduled to be shared further through Lecture Series in approved Maritime Training Institutions (MTIs) in Nigeria as well as other relevant avenues as applicable.



### Safety Investigation Report

NIMASA-MAI-SIR-23-04

Report Completed: 04<sup>th</sup> October, 2023

## APPENDIX: EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND SHORE AUTHORITY INVOLVEMENT

PARTIES INVOLVED	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Vessel Owners</li> <li>2. Vessel crews</li> <li>3. Nigerian Navy</li> <li>4. Medical Personnel</li> </ol>
RESOURCES USED	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Speed boats for rescue</li> </ol>
ACTION TAKEN	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Shore notification</li> <li>2. Personnel rescue</li> <li>3. Medical First Aid</li> <li>4. Search for missing persons</li> </ol>
RESULTS ACHIEVED	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. 10 persons rescued</li> <li>2. Rescued persons given medical aid</li> <li>3. Missing persons found dead and deposited at the morgue.</li> </ol>